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Abstract
This paper examines the conditions needed for equilibrium (in)determinacy in growth
models characterized by perfect competition and a balanced-budget rule (BBR). Contrary
to the literature that assumes zero public debt, we build an endogenous growth model
with a generalized BBR authorizing a constant positive debt level. We show that the
emergence of aggregate instability dramatically depends on the dynamics of the debt-to-
GDP ratio and the strength of social labor externalities. If the labor demand is positively
sloped and steeper than the labor supply, two reachable balanced-growth paths appear – a
no growth trap, and a positive growth solution – that gives birth to both local and global
indeterminacy, hence aggregate instability driven by self-fulfilling beliefs (sunspots). In
addition, we show that a fiscal rule such that the tax rate strongly responds to public-
debt increases can remove the no-growth trap, and secure positive long-run growth.
JEL classification : E62; O41
Keywords: Endogenous growth; indeterminacy; balanced-budget rules
1. Introduction
The emergence of indeterminacy in growth models characterized by perfect competi-
tion and a balanced-budget rule have received much attention in macroeconomic theory.
In a seminal paper, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997, henceforth SU) first show that the
steady state of a neoclassical growth model can be locally undetermined, giving rise to
belief-driven fluctuations (sunspots). In their setup, public spending is exogenous, and
the adjustment variable in the government’s budget constraint is the tax rate on labor
income.
Many recent contributions pursued the SU’s research program by assuming a public
spending-based adjustment with a fixed tax rate. Indeterminacy then crucially depends
1Corresponding author: alexandru.minea@uca.fr.
We are particularly indebted to Jess Benhabib, Gareth Myles, and Alain Venditti for extensive excellent
comments and suggestions on a previous version. Usual disclaimers apply.
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on the usefulness of government expenditures. If public spending exerts some positive
externality in households’ utility function or in the production function, the steady state
can remain undetermined.2 However, if government expenditures are “wasteful”, Guo
and Harrison (2004, henceforth GH) showed that the steady state exhibits saddle-path
stability, thus removing indeterminacy. Indeed, in an exogenous growth setup with a
fixed tax rate on labor, the decreasing marginal products of capital and labor prevent
agents expectations from becoming self-fulfilling.
The present paper explores the conditions for indeterminacy to appear in an endoge-
nous growth framework, with other assumptions similar to SU and GH (in particular:
a continuous-time one-sector model with endogenous labor, an additive utility function,
and a balanced-budget rule, hereafter BBR). In this setup, we introduce two important
ingredients. First, based on the seminal contribution of Benhabib and Farmer (1994),
the aggregate production function exhibits increasing return-to-scale. With endogenous
growth, the total factor productivity depends on the economy-wide levels of capital and
labor through external effects in the production process (in the next section we detail
several arguments that explain why labor social returns can be higher than the individual-
firm returns). This can generate high labor externalities that produce nonlinearities in
the dynamics of the consumption-to-capital ratio. Second, thanks to endogenous growth,
our setup is characterized by non-trivial dynamics of the debt-to-capital ratio, even under
the BBR. Effectively, the BBR defines situations such that public debt is constant, but
non necessarily zero.3 When the rate of economic growth is endogenously determined,
such situations are consistent with either (i) a permanent positive growth giving rise to
a (asymptotical) zero debt ratio in the long run, or (ii) a positive long-run debt ratio
associated with the (asymptotical) disappearance of growth. This creates the possibility
of multiple perfect-foresight balanced-growth paths (BGP).
Our results are as follows.
First, we show that, in an endogenous growth framework, wasteful government spend-
ing can be associated to both local and global indeterminacy. This finding conflicts with
the GH’s determinacy result established in a neoclassical growth model.
Second, we exhibit two regimes depending on the strength of social labor externalities.
2See, e.g., Futagami and Mino (1995); Cazzavillan (1996); Palivos et al. (2003); Chen (2006); Guo
and Harrison (2008); Chen and Guo (2013a,b), among others. Capital-labor substitution or consumption
externalities can also generate indeterminacy in exogenous growth model, see, e.g. Alonso-Carrera et al.
(2008) and Wong and Yip (2010).
3A number of recent works have shown that endogenous growth setups provide a useful framework
for analyzing the effects of a continuous grow of public debt in the long run; see, e.g., Minea and Villieu
(2012); Nishimura et al. (2015a); Boucekkine et al. (2015); Nishimura et al. (2015b); Menuet et al. (2018).
Albeit we focus here on BBR regimes, to make our results easily comparable to GH, our model can be
extended to deficit rules without qualitative changes (see our extension in subsection 4.2).
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If externalities are low, only one steady state, characterized by positive growth, can be
reached in the long run, and the model is locally and globally well-determined. In con-
trast, in the presence of high externalities, two reachable long-run equilibria emerge: a no-
growth trap with positive debt ratio, and a positive-growth BGP with zero debt, the lat-
ter being undetermined. Our model is then characterized by aggregate instability, namely
local and global indeterminacy, driven by self-fulfilling beliefs (sunspot). Importantly, the
condition for indeterminacy to appear is the same as in Benhabib and Farmer (1994),
namely the labor demand must be positively sloped and steeper than the labor supply.
However, our aggregate-instability result covers a broader class of mechanisms than in
Benhabib and Farmer (1994), because it may rely on local and global indeterminacy.
Third, we extend our model, and consider a fiscal rule such that the tax rate strongly
responds to public-debt increases. Even if global indeterminacy remains (because two
positive BGPs are feasible), this tax rule can remove the no-growth trap, and secure
positive long-run growth. Indeed, a sufficient tax-increase can generate a positive re-
lationship between government spending and public debt, such that the debt-to-output
ratio follows an unstable trajectory around the no-growth trap.
Our paper complements the fast-growing literature on indeterminacy in endogenous
growth models.4 Starting from the seminal paper of Matsuyama (1991), local and global
indeterminacy are mainly studied in two (or multiple)-sectors models,5 or in the context
of a public capital externality (productive or welfare-enhancing public spending).
In contrast, in our simple one-sector model with wasteful public spending, indetermi-
nacy comes from two mechanisms. First, the presence of public debt is needed for mul-
tiplicity to arise.6 Indeed, under a BBR, the non-trivial dynamics of the debt-to-capital
ratio give rise to complex interactions between the government’s budget constraint and the
households’ saving behavior. Second, following Benhabib and Farmer (1994); Farmer and
Guo (1994), strong increasing returns-to-scale are needed for indeterminacy to emerge. In
this case, labor supply and output positively depend on consumption, which can generate
indeterminacy.
On the methodological side, the switch from exogenous to endogenous growth settings
has two implications. One the one hand, the SU’s and GH’s conclusions regarding the
determinacy of the steady state when the adjustment is based on wasteful public spending
are dramatically changed.7 On the other hand, in an endogenous growth framework, the
4See the surveys of Benhabib and Farmer (1999), chap. 6, or Mino et al. (2008) regarding the local
indeterminacy.
5See, e.g., Benhabib et al. (2000); Drugeon and Venditti (2001); Brito and Venditti (2010); Nishimura
et al. (2013), among others.
6Some papers have shown that endogenous growth models with public debt generate two steady-states
(Minea and Villieu, 2012; Nishimura et al., 2015a; Menuet et al., 2018).
7This issue has already been raised in the literature on progressive taxation, where neoclassical growth
models are well determined (Guo and Lansing, 1998), while endogenous growth models (Chen and Guo,
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Benhabib and Farmer (1994)’s indeterminacy condition is more realistic. Effectively, since
the total factor productivity is endogenous, strongly increasing returns-to-scale (relative
to all inputs) are reachable even if the production function exhibits constant returns-to-
scale relative to reproducible factors.
In terms of policy implications, our results suggest that a public spending-based ad-
justment, together with a balanced-budget rule, can lead to an indeterminacy driven by
agents’ animal spirits. Then, the economy can converge to a no-growth trap in the long
run. However, we show that this undesirable feature can be removed if the government
adopts a fiscal rule such that the tax rate strongly responds to the increase in public
debt. This result illustrates the so-called concept of “fiscal space”, whereby public debt
sustainability is ensured only if the primary budget surplus positively reacts to the debt
burden (Ostry et al., 2015).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model,
section 3 studies a simple case without public debt, section 4 computes the steady states
in the general case with public debt, section 5 deals with local and global dynamics,
section 6 extends the model to a time-varying tax rate, and section 7 concludes.
2. The model
We consider a simple continuous-time endogenous-growth model with N representa-
tive individuals, and a government. Each representative agent consists of a household
and a competitive firm. All agents are infinitely-lived and have perfect foresights. Popu-
lation remains fixed over time, and we denote individual quantities by lower case letters,
and aggregate quantities by corresponding upper case letters, namely X = Nx, for all
variable X.
2.1. Households
The representative household starts at the initial period with a positive stock of
capital (k0), and chooses the path of consumption {ct}t≥0, hours worked {lt}t≥0, and
capital {kt}t>0 to maximize the present discounted value of its lifetime utility, which is
assumed to be separable
U =
∞∫
0
e−ρt
{
log(ct) −
χ
1 + ε
l1+εt
}
dt, (1)
where ρ ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount rate, ε ≥ 0 is the constant elasticity of
intertemporal substitution in labour, and χ > 0 is a scale parameter.8
2013b) are associated with local indeterminacy.
8The specification corresponds to SU and GH.
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Households use their income (wtlt, where wt is the hourly wage rate), to consume (ct),
and to invest in capital (k̇t) and in government bonds (dt), which return respectively qt
and rt (the real interest rate). They pay taxes on the wage income (τwtlt, where τ is the
exogenous wage tax rate), hence the following budget constraint
k̇t + ḋt = rtdt + qtkt + (1 − τ)wtlt − ct. (2)
Defining by λt the costate variable of the current Hamiltonian, the first-order condi-
tions for the maximization of the household’s programme (with rt = qt in competitive
equilibrium) are
1/ct = λt, (3)
χlεt = λt(1 − τ)wt,
and
λ̇t = (ρ − rt)λt.
These conditions give rise to the familiar Keynes-Ramsey rule
ċt
ct
= rt − ρ, (4)
and to the static relation
χlεt = (1 − τ)wt/ct. (5)
Eq. (5) means that, at each period t, the marginal gain of hours worked (the net real
wage (1 − τ)wt, expressed in terms of marginal utility of consumption 1/ct) just equals
the marginal cost (χlεt ).
Finally, the optimal path of consumption has to verify the set of transversality con-
ditions
lim
t→+∞
{exp(−ρt) u′ (ct) kt} = 0 and lim
t→+∞
{exp(−ρt) u′ (ct) dt} = 0,
ensuring that lifetime utility U is bounded.
2.2. Firms
The representative firm produces output (yt) using private capital (kt) and labor (lt),
augmented by an externality that depends on the aggregate levels of both capital and
labor, namely yt = Ãkαt (lt)
1−αKθ1t L
θ2
t , where Ã > 0 is a scale parameter, α ∈ (0, 1) is the
elasticity of output to private capital, and θ1 and θ2 are positive parameters that reflect
the externalities. This specification closely follows Benhabib and Farmer (1994).
As usual, the production function exhibits constant returns-to-scale at the individual
level. Thus, the first-order conditions for profit maximization (relative to private factors)
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are
rt = α
yt
kt
, (6)
wt = (1 − α)
yt
lt
. (7)
To obtain an endogenous growth path, we consider constant capital returns (θ1 =
1 − α). Thus, in the symmetric equilibrium (Lt = Nlt, and Kt = Nkt) we obtain
Yt = ÃKtL
φ
t , (8)
where φ := 1 − α + θ2.
In our model, labor social returns (φ) can be higher than the individual-firm returns
(1 − α), thanks to the externalities. Three main arguments can sustain such a frame-
work, and explain the presence of the parameter θ2 ≥ 0: (i) knowledge externalities, (ii)
agglomeration effects, and (iii) thick market externalities.
(i) First, following Romer (1986), one can consider that the output of an individual
firm (yt) is obtained with physical and human capital (ht), the latter being produced with
raw labor (or training activity) lt and the economy-wide stock of knowledge Xt, namely
ht = Xtlt. Using a constant returns-to-scale technology, we thus have yt = Ãkαt h
1−α
t .
Suppose that knowledge is produced by a simple Cobb-Douglas technology depending on
the aggregate levels of physical and human capital: Xt = H
β
t K
1−β
t , where β ∈ (0, 1) is a
measure of human capital efficiency in the accumulation of knowledge. At the aggregate
level, we then obtain Ht = KtL
1/(1−β)
t .
9 Hence, the aggregate production function is
Yt = ÃKtL
φ
t , with φ = (1 − α)/(1 − β). Then, parameter θ2 is endogenously determined
as θ2 = β(1 − α)/(1 − β) ≥ 0.
(ii) Second, agglomeration effects can justify Eq. (8). For example, urban production
externalities are likely to produce spillovers among producers in areas with a high den-
sity of economic activity (Krugman, 1991). In the presence of high localized knowledge
spillovers, firms tend to locate in the proximity of each other to capitalize on the aggre-
gate knowledge stock, namely, e.g., ytj = Ãkαt (ltejt)
1−α, where ejt is the agglomeration
externality in location j in time t. Following Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002), ejt mea-
sures the mass of firm in location j, namely, if the size of the agglomeration is assumed
to be one, etj =
∫ 1
0 ytjdj. In symmetric equilibrium, ytj = yt for any j, the aggregate
production function becomes Yt = ÃKtL
(1−α)/α
t . In this case, φ = (1 − α)/α, and the
9Human capital externalities, i.e. the mere idea that your coworkers’ human capital makes you more
productive, are well documented in the empirical literature (see, e.g. Rauch, 1993; Moretti, 2004, who
provide robust support for large human capital externalities). Note that, since knowledge is produced
with both human and physical capital, labor externalities can be very high in the aggregate production
function (8). Alternative models of endogenous growth, based on the Lucas (1988)’s archetype, consider
the formation of human capital through individual training decisions that compete with productive
activities. See also Bond et al. (1996).
6
corresponding value obtained for θ2 is now θ2 = (1 − α)2/α ≥ 0.
(iii) Third, another source of labor externalities may be derived from “thick market
externalities” (Diamond, 1982), namely a friction related to firm-to-firm transactions.
This externality is based on the increasing returns-to-scale matching technology in labor
markets, so that search costs are lower as the size of the labor market increases. 10 The
adoption of an innovation can also generate a positive externality on other traders, thus
creating strategic complementarities between the innovation decisions of different firms
(Acemoglu, 1997). Altogether, these arguments support the presence of labor returns,
which are potentially higher from the social perspective than from the firm-specific level
(i.e. φ > 1 − α).
2.3. The government
The government provides public expenditures Gt, levies taxes, and borrows from
households. The fiscal deficit is financed by issuing debt (Ḋt), hence, the following budget
constraint
Ḋt = rtDt + Gt − τwtLt. (9)
With a fixed tax rate (τ), there are two potential policy instruments in Eq. (9):
public debt (Dt), and public spending (Gt). Following GH, we consider endogenous
public spending under a balanced-budget rule (BBR). Without public debt, this rule is
simply Gt = τwtLt. However, with public debt, the BBR requires Ḋt = 0 ⇒ Dt = D0,∀t,
namely
Gt = τwtLt − rtD0. (10)
Hence; the BBR is consistent with a constant (not necessarily zero) public debt level.
We denote this relation as a generalized BBR. Such a situation characterizes almost all
countries under BBR, because, at the date they adopt the BBR, countries most often
experiment high public debt (D0 > 0). This feature has crucial implications, since our
model can exhibit complex dynamics of the public debt ratio (D0/Yt), even in the presence
of a BBR.11
2.4. Equilibrium
To find endogenous growth solutions, we deflate all growing variables by the capital
stock to obtain long-run stationary ratios, namely (we henceforth omit time indexes)
yk := Y/K, ck := C/K and dk := D0/K.
10Following Hall (1993) “the overall technology of an industry with a thick-market externality will have
increasing returns even though each firm has constant returns ” (p. 94). Caballero and Lyons (1992)
found empirical support for external increasing returns to scale, which can be interpreted as thick-
market externalities. For a growth model with endogenous human capital and labor participation, see
Chen et al. (2011).
11Our results hold with a more general set of deficit rules, such as, e.g., Ḋt = θYt, where θ is the
constant deficit-to-GDP ratio. See the subsection 4.2 for a detailed analysis.
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The optimal consumption behaviour is, from (4) and (6),
Ċ
C
= αyk − ρ, (11)
while the path of the capital stock is given by the goods market equilibrium
K̇
K
= yk − ck − gk. (12)
From (6) and (10), the public spending ratio is defined as
gk = [τ(1 − α) − αdk]yk, (13)
and from (5) and (7) we obtain the output ratio
yk = Ac
ψ
k , (14)
where ψ := φ/(φ − 1 − ε), and A := Ã
[
χ
Ã(1−α)(1−τ)Nε
]ψ
> 0.
The relationship between the consumption and the output ratios crucially depends
on the sign of ψ, which is related to the strength of labor social returns. Effectively, the
aggregate production function can exhibit increasing labor return if labor market exter-
nalities are high enough (i.e. θ2 > α ⇒ φ > 1). Consequently, ψ can be either positive
– and higher than one –12 or negative, thereby depicting an increasing or a decreasing
relation between the consumption and the output ratios.
The reduced-form of the model is obtained from Eqs. (6)-(7)-(10)–(11)-(12)-(13),
namely, using d̄ := (1 − τ)(1 − α) ∈ (0, 1),
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
ċk
ck
= ck − ρ − (d̄ + αdk)yk,
ḋk = [ck − (d̄ + α + αdk)yk]dk.
(15)
As it should clearly appear, the presence of a constant positive public debt level in
the generalized BBR (10) generates non trivial dynamics of the public-debt ratio (dk) in
the reduced form (15). In an exogenous growth context, the generalized BBR (10) does
not fundamentally change the dynamic properties of the steady state compared with a
simple BBR without debt, because the steady-state is unique and well determined, just as
in GH (see Appendix A). With endogenous growth, in contrast, the generalized BBR, if
associated to strong increasing returns in the production function, can produce multiple
12Observe that ψ > 0 ⇒ ψ > 1. Indeed, as φ > 0, the image of function φ &→ φ/(φ− 1− ε) is R \ (0, 1).
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perfect-foresight BGPs with possible local and global indeterminacy, as we will see.
We determine the steady-state solutions of the model in section 4, and analyze local
and global dynamics in section 5. Beforehand, to isolate the specific role of increasing
returns and provide some intuition on the underlying mechanisms of the model, section
3 presents a simple special case without public debt.
3. A preliminary analysis: the case without public debt
Without public debt (dk = ḋk = 0), the BBR simply writes Gt = τwtLt, and, using
(13), the reduced-form of the model (15) boils down to a unique equation
ċk
ck
= ck − ρ − d̄Acψk =: Ψ(ck), (16)
such that the long-run consumption ratio is defined by the implicit relation Ψ(ck) = 0.
If ψ < 0, Ψ(·) is continuously increasing, hence the existence of one unique positive
solution (point P in Figure 1a). Moreover, as Ψ′(·) > 0, this solution is unstable. Since
the consumption ratio ck is a jump variable, the steady state is well-determined (the
economy initially jumps at point P ).
However, if ψ > 1, Ψ(·) takes a maximum at point ĉk := (ψd̄A)1/(1−ψ), such that
Ψ′(ĉk) = 0 and Ψ′′(ĉk) < 0. Thus, there are two positive long-run solutions, namely
cNk and c
P
k , which correspond respectively to points N and P in Figure 1b. Note that
cNk is associated to a negative growth rate in steady state, while c
P
k is associated to
a positive BGP, under the mild condition that the discount rate is small enough, i.e.
ρ < ρ̄ := αA[A(α+ d̄)]ψ/(1−ψ), that we assume throughout the paper (as we will see below,
this condition ensures the existence of BGPs).13 Clearly, as Ψ′(cNk ) > 0 and Ψ
′(cPk ) < 0,
and ck being a jump variable, the negative growth solution is unstable (well determined)
while the positive growth solution is saddle-point stable (locally undetermined).
Figure 1: Phase portrait in the no-debt case
13In the long run, the growth rate is γ = αAcψk −ρ. Thus, since ψ > 1, γ > 0 ⇔ ck > c̄k := (ρ/αA)1/ψ.
Yet, Ψ(c̄k) > 0 ⇔ ρ < ρ̄. Consequently, if ρ < ρ̄, there are two positive solutions: cNk < c̄k and cPk > c̄k;
hence, the long-run growth rate is negative at point N and positive at point P .
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Consequently, in the case ψ > 1 the economy is characterized by aggregate instability
that relies both on local and global indeterminacy. Effectively, two perfect-foresight
BGPs can be reached in the long-run (global indeterminacy), and the transition path in
the neighborhood of P is subject to sunspot equilibria (local indeterminacy). If ψ < 0,
in contrast, the BGP is unique and there is no aggregate instability, as in GH.
The existence of these two regimes crucially rests on the relation between the con-
sumption and the output ratios in Eq. (14), which can be either positive or negative.
This property comes from the labor market equilibrium (5). As consumption increases,
its marginal utility decreases, thus inducing the representative household to substitute
leisure for working hours, because the shadow price of labor (λ, see Eq. 3) declines. The
higher the elasticity (ε) the stronger the reduction in worked hours. To restore equi-
librium, the real wage must rise. In the first order condition for profit maximization
(7), this arises only if the average product of labor (Y/L) goes up, namely if φ > 1.
Therefore, as the consumption ratio jumps up, households are induced to increase labor
supply only if the real wage responds strongly enough to compensate the disutility of
work (φ > 1 + ε ⇒ ψ > 1); hence a rise in the output ratio. In the opposite case
(φ < 1 + ε ⇒ ψ < 0), labor supply decreases and the output ratio goes down.
The intuition of this analysis is close to Benhabib and Farmer (1994), but in the
context of endogenous growth. By injecting the real wage rate (7) into the first-order
condition for the optimal choice of labor (5), we obtain
χ(Ct/Kt)(Lt/N)
ε = A(1 − τ)(1 − α)Lφ−1t .
By taking logarithms, the labor supply curve is
w̃t = cst1 + ln(Ct/Kt) + εL̃t,
and the labor demand curve is
w̃t = cst2 + (φ − 1)L̃t.
where w̃t is the logarithm of the real wage per capital, and L̃t the logarithm of the real
labor (with the two constants cst1 := ln(χ/N ε) and cst2 := ln(A(1 − τ)(1 − α))). Thus,
labor demand is decreasing with real wage if and only if φ < 1. In this case, the higher the
consumption ratio, the higher the employment and the output on the BGP. In contrast,
if φ > 1, labor demand is, in equilibrium, positively-sloped.
Figure 2 examines the effects of a rise in the consumption ratio in the case of a
positively-sloped labor demand (φ > 1). If ε < φ − 1 (i.e. ψ > 0), the slope of the
demand curve (φ − 1) exceeds the slope of the supply curve (ε), so that an increase in
the consumption-to-capital ratio rises employment, output, and the real wage (see Figure
2a). In contrast, if ε > φ− 1 (i.e. ψ < 0), a rise in the consumption ratio is accompanied
10
by a decline in employment and output on the BGP (Figure 2b illustrates this case for
1 < φ < 1 + ε).
w̃t
L̃t
ck
0
labor demand
labor supply
•
•
a. If ε < φ − 1
w̃t
L̃t
ck
0
labor demand
labor supply
•
•
b. If ε > φ − 1
Figure 2: Effect of a rise in the consumption ratio (positively sloped labor demand)
Importantly, the condition ψ > 0 corresponds to the Benhabib and Farmer (1994)’s
criterion to generate local indeterminacy in a neoclassical growth model with increasing
returns. In our model too, a necessary condition for aggregate instability to emerge is
that the real wage is increasing with the employment level.
Two points deserve particular attention. First, although this criterion has been chal-
lenged from an empirical perspective,14 in our endogenous growth setup the condition
φ > 1 + ε is realistic. Effectively, considering the knowledge-externality interpretation of
the model (with the firm-specific and knowledge production functions yt = Ãkαt (Xtlt)
1−α
and Xt = H
β
t K
1−β
t , respectively), this condition is verified for, e.g., β > α if the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply is infinite (ε = 0), as usual in business cycle literature (see, e.g.
SGU). It looks as quite reasonable to suppose that the elasticity of knowledge to human
capital is greater than the physical capital share in output (around α = 1/3).
Second, in our model, the criterion φ > 1 + ε is a necessary and sufficient condition
to ensure not only local but also global indeterminacy. Nevertheless, at this stage our
14To this day, there is no agreement in the literature on the degree of aggregate returns-to-scale. The
first papers based on simple linear regressions in macro models highlighted quantitatively significant
increasing returns-to-scale in U.S. manufacturing (Caballero and Lyons, 1992; Hall, 1993). Subsequent
works challenged this view (Basu and Fernald, 1997; Burnside, 1996), suggesting that the U.S. manufac-
turing industry displays constant returns with no external effects (while there is significant heterogeneity
across industries). However, more recent papers found that, contrary to many previous results, US
economic growth has been driven by increasing returns-to-scale rather than technical progress (Diew-
ert and Fox, 2008). As pointed out by Hall (1993), this controversy can be related to the difficulty of
identifying separately the returns to scale and TFP growth. In neoclassical (exogenous) growth models,
TPF is the engine of growth, and the measure of returns-to-scale must be insolated from the measure of
technical progress. In our endogenous growth setting, TFP is endogenous, and the production function
exhibits constant returns-to-scale relative to reproducible factors, i.e. when labor is measured in efficient
units (yt = Ãkαt h
1−α
t ). This does not preclude the existence of large increasing returns-to-scale at the
aggregate level, associated to endogenous technical change.
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setup exhibits two shortcomings. Effectively, the absence of transitory dynamics and the
presence of a negative long-run BGP are questionable, both on the empirical side and
from an endogenous growth perspective. The following sections address these issues, by
considering the general version of the model with public debt.
4. The general case with public debt
In the general model, we define a BGP as a path on which consumption, capital, and
output grow at the same (endogenous) rate, namely: ċk = ḋk = 0 in (15). Thus, for any
steady-state i, we have: γi := Ċ/C = K̇/K = Ẏ /Y , while the real interest rate (ri) is
constant.
The long-run endogenous growth solutions can be described by two relations between
ck and dk. The first one is the ċk = 0 locus, which comes from the Keynes-Ramsey
relation (11) and the IS equilibrium (12)
ck − ρ = (d̄ + αdk)yk. (17)
The second relation is the ḋk = 0 locus, namely
γdk = 0, (18)
where γ := (d̄ + α + αdk)yk − ck is the long-run growth rate. Eq. (18) means that either
the long-run public debt is positive and the associated growth rate is zero (zero growth
solution, such as dk > 0 ⇒ γ = 0), or the long-run growth rate is positive (or negative)
with zero public debt (γ > (<)0 ⇒ dk = 0).
4.1. Characterization of steady states
Steady-state solutions are obtained at the crossing-points of Eqs. (17) and (18).
Theorem 1. If ρ < ρ̄, the long-run equilibria are characterized by the following regimes.
• Regime R1: ψ < 0. There are one positive growth solution (point Q), and one zero
growth solution (point Z).
• Regime R2: ψ > 0. There are one negative solution (N), one positive solution (P ),
and one zero growth solution (point Z).
Proof. See Appendix B.
The multiplicity of steady states comes from the interaction between two nonlinear
relationships linking the consumption and the debt ratios.
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(i) The first relation stems from the government’s budget constraint ḋk = −γdk = 0,
which is verified either if dk = 0 (namely the x-axis in Figures 3 and 4) or if
γ = (d̄ + α + αdk)yk(ck) − ck = ck[(d̄ + α + αdk)Acψ−1k − 1] = 0.
Considering strictly-positive consumption ratios, this relation describes a monotonic
association between ck and dk, which is positively-sloped if ψ < 0 (Figure 3), and
negatively-sloped if ψ > 0 ⇒ ψ > 1 (Figure 4).
(ii) The second relation is derived from the assumption of balanced-growth in the long
run (namely K̇/K = Ċ/C = γ), and corresponds to (17), with yk(ck) = Ac
ψ
k .
If ψ < 0, an increase in the consumption ratio (ck) reduces the output ratio (yk),
decreasing the RHS of (17). This generates a monotonic increasing relation between ck
and dk (any positive deficit ratio is associated with one consumption ratio), as depicted
in Figure 3. Therefore, there is only one consumption ratio that verifies dk = 0, hence
the uniqueness of the non-zero growth solution (point Q).
Figure 3: Phase portrait under regime R1
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Figure 4: Phase portrait under regime R2
In contrast, if ψ > 0 (see Figure 4), output increases with the consumption ratio,
so that the two sides of Eq. (17) positively depend on ck, producing a non-monotonic
relationship between ck and dk. In this case, any positive deficit ratio is associated with
two consumption ratios. Consequently, two levels of ck verify dk = 0, hence the two
non-zero growth solutions (points N and P ).
4.2. Extension to permanent deficit rules
Although we focused so far on the BBR, our setup can be extended to the presence
of continuous growth of public debt in the long run. Indeed, a number of recent papers
have shown that endogenous growth is feasible with growing public debt in the steady
state.15 With endogenous growth, output grows continuously along the BGP, allowing
public debt to grow continuously (since the BGP is such that all variables grow at the
same rate, the debt-to-output ratio is constant in the steady-state). Thus, contrary to
exogenous growth models, the BBR is not necessarily required.
Hence, our model can be extended to deficits rules involving a constant deficit-to-
output ratio θ ≥ 0, such that16
Ḋt = θYt. (19)
In this respect, the case θ = 0 amounts to our generalized BBR, which corresponds
to a constant (but not necessarily zero) public debt.
15See, e.g., Minea and Villieu (2012), Nishimura et al. (2015a), Nishimura et al. (2015b), and Menuet
et al. (2018) for an extension to money financing.
16This rule authorizes permanent deficits in the long run, which is consistent with OECD’s fiscal
positions (prior to the Great Recession, the average public deficit was about 2.5% of GDP from 1970 to
2005, namely θ = 0.025). One could also specify a deficit rule with a gradual adjustment path of the
deficit-to-output ratio to a long-run target without qualitative change in the model.
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With such a deficit rule, the reduced form of the model (15) must be amended as
follows: (i) coefficient d̄ must be redefined as d̄ := (1 − τ)(1 − α) − θ, which is positive
for small θ, and (ii) the debt to capital ratio now evolves according to
ḋk = θyk + [ck − (d̄ + α + αdk)yk]dk.
Consequently, the ċk = 0 locus (17) is unchanged, notwithstanding the redefinition of
d̄, while the ḋk = 0 locus (18) becomes now
θyk = γdk. (20)
With small positive values of the deficit ratio (namely θ > 0), previous results are
qualitatively unchanged, as show Figures 5 and 6, where the dashed- (resp. continuous-)
bold lines describe the ḋk = 0 locus in the case θ = 0 (resp. θ > 0). The major change
is that the ḋk = 0 locus is now a smooth curve that intersects twice the ċk = 0 locus,
with point Z being now characterized by positive growth. Hence, the deficit rule θ > 0
precludes negative and zero growth solutions in the steady state, because the long-run
economic growth rate must be γ = Ḋ/D = θY/D > 0 in equilibrium. For the same
reason, the no-growth trap Z becomes now a low -growth trap, with (small) positive
economic growth in equilibrium.
Figure 5: Phase portrait under regime R1 (θ > 0)
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Figure 6: Phase portrait under regime R2 (θ > 0)
5. Analysis of dynamics
To study the behaviour of the model outside the steady-state, we first proceed to a
local stability analysis, and then infer global dynamics. To simplify the exposition, we
focus on the (generalized) BBR case (θ = 0).17
5.1. Local dynamics
By linearization in the neighborhood of steady-state i, i ∈ {N,P,Q,Z}, the system
(15) behaves according to (ċk, ḋk) = Ji(ck − cik, dk − dik), where Ji is the Jacobian matrix.
The reduced-form includes one jump variable (the consumption ratio ck0) and one pre-
determined variable (the public-debt ratio dk0, since the initial stocks of public debt D0
and private capital K0 are predetermined). Thus, for BGP i to be well determined, Ji
must have two opposite-sign eigenvalues. Using (15), we compute
Ji =
(
CC i CDi
DCi DDi
)
,
where
CC i = cik − (d̄ + αdik)ψyik, (21)
CDi = −αcikyik, (22)
DDi = −γi − αdikyik, (23)
DCi = [1 − Aψ(cik)ψ−1(d̄ + α + αdik)]dik. (24)
17The behaviour of the model is qualitatively unchanged with a deficit rule (θ > 0), provided that the
deficit ratio is small (formally θ → 0).
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Hence, the trace and the determinant of the Jacobian matrix are, respectively
Tr(Ji) = cik − (d̄ + αdik)ψyik − γi − αdikyik, (25)
det(Ji) = −γi[cik − (d̄ + αdik)ψyik] − ψα2(yik)2dik. (26)
The following theorem establishes the topological behaviour of each steady-state.
Theorem 2. (Local Stability)
• In regime R1, Z is locally over-determined (unstable), and Q is locally determined
(saddle-point stable).
• In regime R2, Z is locally determined (saddle-point), P is locally under-determined
(stable), and N is locally over-determined (unstable).
Proof. See Appendix C.
The local stability of the zero growth solution (Z) is intuitive. Indeed, the sign of
the determinant is the opposite of the sign of ψ. Therefore, in regime R2 (ψ > 0), the
determinant is negative, hence the saddle-path property. In regime R1 (ψ < 0), both the
determinant and the trace are positive, hence the point Z is unstable.
As regards the non-zero growth solutions, we have dik = 0, namely DC
i = 0, i ∈
{P,N,Q}. Consequently, the two eigenvalues (λi1,λi2) are simply λi1 = DDi = −γi, and
λi2 = CC
i = cik − (d̄ + αdik)yik. In regime R1, point Q is associated to a positive growth
rate (γQ > 0), and to CCQ > 0, hence the law of motion of consumption is unstable.
Consequently, there is one negative and one positive eigenvalue, and Q is saddle-path
stable. In regime R2, in contrast, the positive growth solution is such that CCP < 0.
The law of motion of consumption is then stable, the two eigenvalues are negative, and
P is locally undetermined (stable). At the negative growth solution (point N), however,
we have CCN > 0, so that the two eigenvalues are positive, which makes N a locally
over-determined (unstable) solution.
5.2. Global dynamics
Capitalizing on the local analysis, we can now evaluate the global dynamics. Accord-
ing to theorem 2, we can distinguish two cases, depending on the sign of ψ.
Regime R1 – In this case, there are two steady states, but only the positive growth
solution (Q) can be reached in the long run, as the zero growth trap (Z) is unstable.
Indeed, for any predetermined debt ratio dk0 > 0 the consumption ratio ck0 jumps to place
the economy on the saddle-path that converges towards Q, which defines the unique long-
run equilibrium (hence the absence of local or global indeterminacy). Consequently, in an
endogenous growth setup with wasteful public spending, we find the GH’s determinacy
result. However, this result does not hold in regime R2.
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Regime R2 – As we have seen, there are three steady states: N is unstable, P is
stable, and Z is saddle-path stable. Thus, the situation is characterized by local inde-
terminacy (in the vicinity of the positive growth solution P ), and global indeterminacy.
Indeed, given a (predetermined) public debt ratio dk0 > 0, the initial consumption ra-
tio can jump on the unique transition path that converges towards Z, or on one of the
multiple paths that converges towards P .
Consequently, the long-run equilibrium of the economy is subject to “animal spirits”,
in the form of optimistic or pessimistic views of households at the initial time. The
intuition is as follows. Let us suppose that, at the initial time, households expect a high
consumption ratio and zero debt (point P ) in steady state. Thus, the output ratio is
expected to be high (as ψ > 0), which corresponds to high expected return of private
capital. Then, at the initial time households are induced to save, leading to a self-fulfilling
increase in economic growth. As a result, a belief-driven transitional path towards the
the positive growth BGP (P ) emerges.
In contrast, following the same mechanism, if high public debt and low return of
saving are expected (along the Z BGP), households increase consumption and reduce
investment at the initial time. This puts the economy on a self-fulfilling path towards
the no-growth trap.
5.3. Discussion
In our model, multiplicity and indeterminacy result from two ingredients that closely
interact: the dynamics of the public debt ratio, and the dynamics of the consumption
ratio.
Regarding the first ingredient (ignoring negative growth situations), the BBR gen-
erates two possible BGPs: a zero-growth solution with positive debt, and a zero debt
solution with positive growth. Regarding the second ingredient, the determinacy of these
two equilibria fundamentally depends on the effect of the consumption ratio in the IS
equilibrium. As we have seen, in goods market, consumption increases the demand,
while its effect on supply is more complex and depends on the labor market equilibrium
through the sign of ψ.
If φ < 1 + ε ⇒ ψ < 0, an increase in consumption negatively affects output, because
households are induced to increase leisure. Consequently, a jump in the consumption
ratio (ck) generates an excess demand in the goods market, producing an adverse effect on
capital accumulation (K̇/K). This, leads to an increase in the path of the consumption
ratio (ċk/ck). Hence, the dynamics of ck is unstable, which explains the absence of
indeterminacy.
If φ > 1 + ε ⇒ ψ > 1, following a positive jump in consumption, the rise in the real
wage is strong enough to overcome the disutility of labor, thereby labor supply and output
increase. Interestingly, since ψ > 1, this supply effect outweighs the increase in demand.
As a result, the increase in the consumption ratio now generates a net excess supply in
18
the goods market. This boosts capital accumulation, which dampens the evolution of
the consumption ratio (ċk/ck is reduced). Hence, the dynamic of ck now becomes stable,
giving birth to indeterminacy.
Roughly speaking, our model is in some sense “more stable” in the presence of strong
labor externalities (i.e. ψ > 0). This is consistent with the Benhabib and Farmer (1994)’s
criterion to generate local indeterminacy of the perfect foresight equilibrium in a neo-
classical growth framework. In our endogenous growth setup too, indeterminacy only
emerges if ψ > 0, but this indeterminacy presents a larger perspective than in Benhabib
and Farmer (1994). Effectively, the case ψ > 0 leads not only to local indeterminacy but
also to a multiplicity of equilibria, leading to global indeterminacy. Indeed, for any initial
value of the predetermined variable (the deficit ratio), the economy can reach either a
positive growth solution, or an undesirable stagnation solution with zero growth, accord-
ing to optimistic or pessimistic views of households. Given the undesirable possibility of
the zero growth in the long-run, in the following section we relax the assumption of a
constant tax rate, and attempt to characterize suitable fiscal rules that allow escaping
the no-growth trap.
6. How to remove the no-growth trap? The case with a time-varying tax rate
So far, we have considered a fixed tax rate. In this section, we extend our analysis
to the case of a time-varying tax rate. To this end, we assume that the government is
subject to a tax rule τ(dk), which belongs to the class of tax rules (T ) requiring a higher
tax rate as the public debt increases, namely T := {τ(dk)|τ(dk) ∈ C2, τ ′(dk) ≥ 0}. To
assess whether such a fiscal rule allows removing the no-growth solution, we focus from
now on regime R2.
It must be emphasised that, even if the tax rate is variable, the fiscal rule τ(dk)
remains exogenously specified, and the adjustment variable in the government’s budget
constraint remains wasteful public spending (gk), as in the previous sections.
The dynamic system (15) becomes
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
ċk
ck
= ck − ρ − (d̄(dk) + αdk)yk,
ḋk = [ck − (d̄(dk) + α + αdk)yk]dk,
(27)
where d̄(dk) = (1 − τ(dk))(1 − α) ∈ (0, 1).
With a time-varying tax rate, the relationship between public debt and public spend-
ing is modified. Effectively, as gk = rdk + τ(dk)wtLt = [τ(dk)(1 − α) − αdk]yk, we can
distinguish two cases following an increase in the debt ratio (dk).
(i) If τ ′(dk) < τ̂ := α/(1 − α), the increase in the debt burden exceeds the new
fiscal revenues, forcing public spending to decline, i.e. ∂gk/∂dk < 0. The situation is
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qualitatively unchanged relative to the previous sections.
(ii) In contrast, if the fiscal rule generates high tax revenues, namely τ ′(dk) > τ̂ ,
fiscal resources are strong enough to offset the increase in the debt burden, so that public
expenditures rise, i.e. ∂gk/∂dk > 0. In this case, the dynamics of the model radically
changes, as shows the following theorem.
Theorem 3. In regime R2 (i.e. ψ > 0), if τ ′ > τ̂ , there are critical levels ρ̂ > 0 and
τ̄0 > 0, such that, if ρ < ρ̂ and τ(0) < τ̄0, there are two positive growth solutions (M and
H), and one zero growth solution (Z).
Proof. See Appendix D.
The three equilibria still come from the interaction between two nonlinear relation-
ships linking the consumption and the deficit ratios. If τ ′ < τ̂ , the situation is unchanged
compared with the theorem 1. However, if τ ′ > τ̂ , two positive growth solutions emerge.
Effectively, regarding the phase portrait (see Figure 7),18 there are two main differences
relative to the previous section.
First, the stationary locus ċk = 0 now describes a U-shaped curve in the (ck, dk)-plane,
and corresponds to
ck − ρ = ζ(dk)yk(ck), where ζ(dk) := d̄(dk) + αdk. (28)
As τ ′(dk) > τ̂ ⇔ ζ ′(dk) < 0, the relationship between dk and ck (in Figure 7) is inverted
with respect to the preceding case under regime R2 (see Figure 4).
Second, the locus ḋk/dk = 0 now describes an increasing curve, namely
γ = (ζ(dk) + α)yk(ck) − ck = ck[(ζ(dk) + α)cψ−1k − 1] = 0.
As ψ > 1, an increase in ck rises the economic growth rate, hence a monotonic increasing
relationship between ck and dk, because ζ ′(dk) < 0.
Therefore, both loci are reversed relative to section 4. Effectively, if τ ′ > τ̂ , any
increase of the debt ratio (dk) rises public spending (gk) and thus reduces the economic
growth rate (γ), whereas in section 4 with a constant tax rate (or more largely when
τ ′ < τ̂), public spending and deficit were negatively related (see Eq. (13)). Consequently,
by implementing highly debt-sensitive tax rules, the relationship between public debt and
economic growth reverses.
18We build the phase portrait for a linear fiscal rule (see Appendix E for technical details).
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Figure 7: The phase portrait in regime R2 with τ ′ > τ̂
Local dynamics. Let us now study the local stability when τ ′ > τ̂ . By differentiat-
ing system (27), the components of the jacobian matrix Ji for steady-state i ∈ {H,M,Z},
are
CC i = cik − ζ(dik)ψyik, (29)
CDi = −ζ ′(dik)cikyik, (30)
DDi = −γi − ζ ′(dik)dikyik, (31)
DC i = [1 − Aψ(cik)ψ−1(ζ(dik) + α)]dik. (32)
Thus, the trace and the determinant of the Jacobian matrix are, respectively
Tr(Ji) = cik − ζ(dik)ψyik − γi − ζ ′(dik)dikyik, (33)
det(Ji) = −[cik − ζ(dik)ψyik]γi − αψζ ′(dik)(yik)2dik, (34)
and the following theorem characterizes the topological behaviour of each BGP.
Theorem 4. The zero-growth solution (Z) is unstable, the medium-growth solution (M)
is saddle-path stable, and the high-growth solution (H) is stable.
Proof. See Appendix F.
The intuition driving the local behaviour of the positive growth solutions is the same as
previously in regime R2. At points M and H, the two eigenvalues are: λi1 = DDi = −γi,
and λi2 = CC
i = cik − ζ(0)ψyk. For ψ > 0, the medium-growth equilibrium M is such
that CCM > 0, hence the law of motion of consumption is unstable. Consequently, there
is one negative and one positive eigenvalue, and M is saddle-path stable. In contrast, the
point H is such that CCH < 0. The law of motion of consumption is then stable, the
two eigenvalues are negative, and H is locally undetermined (stable).
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The heart of the mechanism that makes the zero-growth solution unstable is related
to the relationship between public debt and public spending (∂gk/∂dk). As discussed
above, we can distinguish two cases.
(i) If this relation is negatively-sloped (τ ′ < τ̂), any increase in the public debt ra-
tio produces a higher net-of-taxes debt burden that requires a cut in public spending.
This cut, in turn, generates a higher rate of capital accumulation in the goods market
equilibrium, such that the debt-to-output ratio will decrease. Hence the stability of the
debt path, which leads to the saddle-path property of the no-growth solution Z, as in the
previous section.
(ii) In the case of a positively-sloped relation (τ ′ > τ̂), however, the increase of the
debt ratio generates enough fiscal resources too increase public spending despite the BBR.
Consequently, the rate of capital accumulation falls in goods market equilibrium, and
the debt-to-output ratio undertakes an unstable trajectory. As a result, the no-growth
solution becomes unstable.
Global dynamics. If τ ′ > τ̂ , the economy is characterized by both local indeter-
minacy (in the vicinity of the high growth solution H) and global indeterminacy. For a
given (predetermined) public debt ratio dk0 > 0, the initial consumption ratio can jump
on the unique transition path that converges towards the medium-growth equilibrium
(M), or on one of the multiple paths that converge towards H.
The main interest of a varying tax rate is that the economy cannot experiment the
no-growth trap in the long run, provided that τ ′ > τ̂ . This analysis points out the need
for indebted countries to implement stringent fiscal rules in order to make tolerable their
public finance stance. This feature is consistent with the concept of the “fiscal space”,
whereby public debt sustainability is ensured only if the primary budget surplus positively
reacts to the debt burden (Ostry et al., 2015). As outlined by the proponents of fiscal
space, the adjustment of the primary surplus can be made difficult given the presence of
some social resistance to tax-increases, notably in a context of high debt. Therefore, the
case with τ ′ < τ̂ reflects a narrow fiscal space, while the case τ ′ > τ̂ can be associated
to a large fiscal space. In these lines, our model reveals that the no-growth trap can be
removed only if the fiscal space is large enough.19 However, as in the previous section,
global indeterminacy remains and raises a similar selection problem, since the economy
can converge towards different positive growth solutions.
7. Concluding remarks
This paper shows that local and global indeterminacy can appear in a one-sector en-
dogenous growth model, when wasteful public expenditures adjust to the government’s
19A related analysis in a two-period game theoretic approach with tax policy becoming procyclical at
high debt ratios is conducted by Camous and Gimber (2018).
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budget constraint. This result contrasts with usual findings in neoclassical (exogenous)
growth models, showing that indeterminacy can emerge only with a tax-based adjuste-
ment (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 1997), or when public expenditures are useful, i.e. pro-
duce utility services and/or productive externalities (see, e.g. Guo and Harrison, 2008).
Therefore, endogenous growth models can reverse results obtained in exogenous growth
setups, as in Guo and Harrison (2004).
Fundamentally, this result comes from the nature of the BBR, which is consistent
with non trivial dynamics of the debt ratio when considering endogenous growth. In our
framework, ignoring negative growth solutions in steady-state, two admissible long-run
equilibria emerges: a zero-growth BGP with positive debt, and a positive-growth BGP
with zero debt. Both BGPs can be reached, as the stability analysis does not allow
selecting a unique equilibrium.
However, a fiscal rule such that the tax rate strongly responds to public-debt in-
creases can remove the no-growth trap, and secure positive long-run growth (even if
indeterminacy remains, because two positive BGPs are feasible). This analysis calls for
implementing tight tax policies in indebted countries,
This paper can be extended in several directions. For example, it would be worthwhile
to examine alternative fiscal rules (see, e.g. Combes et al., 2017), or to introduce the case
for money-financing (Menuet et al., 2018). In addition, possible extensions would study
the robustness of our theoretical results, as the specification of non-separable preferences,
progressive endogenous taxes, or useful public spending. We plan to pursue these research
projects in the future.
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Appendix A. Exogenous growth with public debt
In the context of exogenous growth, the production function (8) is rewritten as
Yt = AK
α
t L
1−α
t ,
with α ∈ (0, 1), and the model is otherwise unchanged. From Eqs. (6)-(7)-(10)–(11)-
(12)-(13), we can write the reduced form of the model. To this end, we use the following
logarithmic transformation of variables: k̃t := log(Kt) and c̃t := log(Ct)
˙̃kt = [1 − τ(1 − α) + αD0e−k̃t ]eλ0+λ1k̃t+λ2c̃t − ec̃t−k̃t , (A.1)
˙̃ct = αe
λ0+λ1k̃t+λ2c̃t − ρ, (A.2)
where λ0 = (1 − α) log{(1 − α)(1 − τ)/A}/(α + ε), λ1 := −ε(1 − α)/(α + ε), and λ2 :=
−(1 − α)/(α + ε). We thus obtain a dynamic system identical to GH (Eqs 11-12 p. 360,
with δ = τk = 0), except that a new term related to public debt (D0) appears in the
dynamics of capital accumulation (A.1).
Lemma 1. There is a non-empty set of parameters that ensures the existence and unique-
ness of the long-run steady-state.
Proof. In the long-run, from the Keynes-Ramsey relationship (Ċt/Ct = α(Yt/Kt)−ρ = 0),
we have L/K = (ρ/αA)1/(1−α). From the goods market equilibrium (with K̇t = 0), it
follows that
C
K
+
G
K
=
Y
K
=
ρ
α
. (A.3)
By the government’s budget constraint (10), the public spending ratio is, in steady
state (with the real interest rate being r = αY/K = ρ)
G
K
= τ(1 − α) ρ
α
− ρD0
K
. (A.4)
The first-order condition on labor supply (5) now leads to
C
K
= (1 − τ)(1 − α)AK−(1+ε)
( ρ
αA
)−(α+ε)/(1−α)
. (A.5)
Introducing (A.5) and (A.4) in (A.3), we obtain an implicit relation in K
F(K) = G(K),
where F(K) := A[1 − τ(1 − α)]K, and G(K) := A(1 − τ)(1 − α)
(
ρ
αA
) 1−ε
1−α K−ε − αAD0.
Clearly, as G is a monotonic decreasing continuous function, according to the intermediate
value theorem, there is a unique critical value K∗ > 0 such that F(K∗) = G(K∗) for an
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usual constellation of parameters. From Eqs. (A.4)-(A.5), we find the associated long-run
values of C∗ and G∗.
In addition, as G(·) negatively depends on D0, any increase in public debt reduces the
long-run capital stock (see Figure A.8).
Figure A.8: The steady state
It is straightforward to show that the steady-state is well determined, independently
of the public debt level. Effectively, denoting X := eλ0+λ1k̃
∗+λ2c̃∗ , the determinant of
system (A.1)-(A.2) is, in the neighborhood of the steady state ( c̃∗, k̃∗),
det = λ1αXe
c̃∗−k̃∗ + λ2αX[e
c̃∗−k̃∗ − D0Xe−k̃
∗
] < 0,
since, by (A.1), ec̃
∗−k̃∗ − D0Xe−k̃
∗
= [1 − τ(1 − α)]X > 0.
Therefore, in a neoclassical (exogenous) growth model with public spending being
the adjustment variable in the government’s budget constraint, a constant public debt
D0 reduces the long-run capital stock K∗, without generating multiplicity of long-run
solutions or indeterminacy of the transition path. This result generalizes GH’s findings
to balanced-budget rules associated with a positive debt level.
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 1
• Zero-growth solution. From the Keynes-Ramsey relation (11), we have: γ = Ċ/C =
0 ⇔ αyk = ρ. Consequently, the zero-growth solution (denoted by point Z in
Figures 3-6) is characterized by cZk =
(
ρ
αA
)1/ψ
> 0.
From (18), γZ = 0 ⇔ (d̄ + α + αdZk )yZk − cZk = 0. Thus, as cZk > 0, we have
dZk =
1
α
{
1
A(cZk )
ψ−1 − d̄ − α
}
.
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The existence of the zero-growth solution (namely dZk > 0) is ensured if ρ < ρ̄ :=
αA[A(d̄ + α)]ψ/(1−ψ).
• Non-zero growth solutions. As dk = 0, we have, using Eq. (17),
Ψ(ck) := ck − ρ − d̄Acψk = 0. (B.1)
The behaviour of function Ψ depends on the sign of ψ.
(i) ψ < 0 ⇔ φ < 1 + ε. In this case, Ψ describes an increasing convex curve
for ck ∈ (0, +∞), where Ψ(0) = −∞ and Ψ(+∞) = +∞. According to the
Intermediate Value Theorem, there is a unique critical value cQk > 0 such that
Ψ(cQk ) = 0.
Besides, in the long run, the growth rate is γ = αAcψk − ρ; hence
γ ≥ 0 ⇔
{
ck ≥ cZk if ψ > 1,
ck ≤ cZk if ψ < 0.
Consequently, if Ψ(cZk ) > 0, i.e. ρ < ρ̄, we have c
Q
k < c
Z
k , and the growth rate is
positive at point Q = (cQk , 0).
(ii) ψ > 0 ⇔ φ > 1 + ε. In this case, Ψ′(ck) ≥ 0 ⇔ ck ≤ ĉk := (ψd̄A)1/(1−ψ), with
Ψ(0) = −ρ < 0, and Ψ(+∞) = −∞, since ψ > 0 ⇒ ψ > 1.
Thus, if Ψ(cZk ) > 0, namely ρ < ρ̄, according to the Intermediate Value Theorem,
there are two positive solutions: cNk < c
Z
k , and c
P
k > c
Z
k ; hence, the economic growth
rate is negative at point N = (cNk , 0) and positive at point P = (c
P
k , 0).
Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 2
We study the local stability of the steady states in the two regimes.
(i) Zero-growth solution. At point Z, as γZ = 0, we have, from Eq. (26), det(JZ) =
−ψα2(yZk )2dZk .
• If ψ > 0 (regime R2), det(JZ) < 0, which means that there are two opposite-sign
eigenvalues, and Z is a saddle-point.
• If ψ < 0 (regime R1), det(JZ) > 0, and, from Eq. (25), Tr(JZ) = cZk − ψd̄yZk −
αdZk y
Z
k [ψ+1] = yk[(d̄+α)−(d̄+αdZk )ψ] > 0. Consequently, there are two eigenvalues
with positive real part, and Z is unstable (over-determined).
(ii) Non-zero growth solution. As dik = 0, from Eq. (26), det(J
i) = −[cik − d̄ψyik]γi,
and Tr(Ji) = cik − d̄ψyik − γi = −γi[det(Ji) + 1]; ∀i ∈ {Q,N,P}.
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• If ψ < 0 (regime R1), there is a unique non-zero growth solution (point Q). As
γQ > 0, we have det(JQ) < 0, namely, Q is a saddle-point.
• If ψ > 0 (regime R2), cik − d̄ψyik < 0 ⇔ cik > ĉk := [1/d̄Aψ]1/(ψ−1). As cNk < ĉk,
and γN < 0 (see Appendix B), we have det(JN) > 0, and Tr(JN) > 0, namely,
N is unstable (over-determined). In contrast, as cPk > ĉk and γ
P > 0, we have
det(JP ) > 0, and Tr(JP ) < 0, namely, P is stable (under-determined).
Appendix D. Proof of Theorem 3
Let us define ζ(dk) := d̄(dk) + αdk, with d̄(dk) = (1 − τ(dk))(1 − α). As τ ′(dk) ≥ τ̂ ,
we have ζ ′(dk) ≤ 0, ∀dk ≥ 0. From system (27), as in section 3, there are two types
of solutions: a zero-growth solution (dk > 0 ⇒ γ = 0), and non-zero growth solutions
(γ > (<)0 ⇒ dk = 0).
(i) Zero growth solution. Following the proof of Theorem 1, the zero-growth BGP
(denoted by point Z in Figure 7) is still characterized by cZk =
(
ρ
αA
)1/ψ
> 0. Besides, we
have
γZ = 0 ⇔ cZk − ρ − ζ(dZk )A(cZk )ψ = 0 ⇔ ζ(dZk ) =
cZk − ρ
A(cZk )
ψ
.
As ζ is a continuous and monotonic function, there is an inverse function ζ−1, and
dZk = ζ
−1
(
cZk − ρ
A(cZk )
ψ
)
.
As ζ : R+ &→ R+, this solution exists if:
(a) cZk > ρ, i.e. ρ < ρ̂1 := (αA)
1/(1−ψ),
(b) (cZk − ρ)/A(cZk )ψ < ζ(0), i.e. τ(0) < τ̄0 := 1 − 11−α
(
cZk −ρ
A(cZk )
ψ
)
.
(ii) Non-zero growth solutions. As dk = 0, for ck > 0 we have, using Eq. (27)
Φ(ck) := ck − ρ − ζ(0)Acψk = 0,
hence, Φ′(ck) > 0 ⇔ ck < ĉk := [Aψζ(0)]1/(1−ψ), with Φ(0) = −ρ and Φ(+∞) = −∞ < 0.
Consequently, if Φ(ĉk) > 0, i.e. ρ < ρ̂2 := ĉk(ψ − 1)/ψ, according to the Intermediate
Value Theorem, there are two positive solutions: ck < ĉk and ck > ĉk.
In addition, the condition (b) τ(0) < τ̄0 states that Φ(cZk ) < 0, namely either c
Z
k <
ck < ĉk < ck or ck < ĉk < ck < c
Z
k . Under the sufficient condition c
Z
k < ĉk, i.e.
ρ < ρ̂3 := αA[Aψζ(0)]ψ/(1−ψ), it is clear that cZk < ck < ck.
Therefore, there are three solutions: a zero growth solution (Z), and two positive
growth solutions that we denote, respectively, the medium-growth solution (point M)
corresponding to ck =: c
M
k , and the high-growth solution (point H) corresponding to
ck =: cHk .
Finally, we denote ρ̂ := min{ρ̂1, ρ̂2, ρ̂3}.
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Appendix E. Phase portrait for a linear tax rule (with ψ > 1)
Let us consider the linear fiscal rule τ(dk) = ηdk + η0, where η0 is a constant ensuring
τ(·) ∈ (0, 1), and η > 0. From system (27), the steady-state is obtained at the crossing-
points of two stationary loci. By denoting ζ(dk) := d̄(dk) + αdk, we have ζ(dk) = dk[α −
η(1 − α)] + (1 − η0)(1 − α), hence ζ ′(·) > 0 ⇔ η < η̂ := α/(1 − α).
The locus ċk = 0 is described by the following equation
dk =
1
α − η(1 − α)
{
ck − ρ
Acψk
− (1 − η0)(1 − α)
}
=: fc(ck).
If η > η̂, we have fc ∈ C2(R∗+), with f ′c(ck) ≥ 0 ⇔ ck ≥ c̃k =: ψρ/(ψ − 1) > 0,
fc(0) = +∞ and fc(+∞) = −(1 − η0)(1 − α)/[α − η(1 − α)] > 0. Thus, fc describes a
U-shaped curve in the (ck, dk)-plane (as in Figure 7), and there are two positive growth
solutions if and only if fc(c̃k) < 0.
The locus ḋk = 0 is such that (considering ck > 0)
dk = 0 or dk =
1
α − η(1 − α)
{
1
Acψ−1k
− (1 − η0)(1 − α) − α
}
=: fd(ck)
If η > η̂, we have fd ∈ C2(R∗+), with f ′d > 0 (as ψ > 1), fd(0) = −∞ and fd(+∞) =
−[(1 − η0)(1 − α) + α]/[α − η(1 − α)] > fc(+∞) > 0. Thus, fd describes an increasing
curve in the (ck, dk)-plane (as in Figure 7). Finally, since dZk > 0, the two stationary loci
cross each other for positive values of dk.
Appendix F. Proof of Theorem 4
Let us suppose that ψ > 0, and τ ′ > τ̂ , namely ζ ′(·) < 0.
• Zero-growth solution (γZ = 0). In this case, we have: det(JZ) = −ψαζ ′(dZk )(yZk )2dZk >
0, and Tr(JZ) = cZk − ζ(dZk )ψyZk − ζ ′(dZk )dZk yZk > cZk − ζ(0)ψyZk , as ζ is a decreas-
ing function. As cZk < c̃k := [Aψζ(0)]
1/(1−ψ) (see Appendix D), it follows that
Tr(JZ) > 0. Consequently, there are two eigenvalues with positive real part, and Z
is unstable.
• Positive-growth solutions. In this case, as dik = 0, i ∈ {M,H}, we have: det(Ji) =
−[cik−ζ(0)ψyik]γi. As γM , γH > 0, cMk < c̃k and cHk > c̃k, it is clear that det(JM) < 0
and det(JH) > 0. Therefore, around steady-state M , there is one negative and one
positive eigenvalue, so that M is saddle-point stable. Besides, we have: Tr(JH) =
cHk − ζ(0)ψyHk −γH = −γH [det(JH)+1] < 0, namely there are two eigenvalues with
negative real part, and H is stable.
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